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Abstract 
 
A Zero knowledge Authentication is a protocol which takes place between two 
parties called the Claimant and the Verifier. In the Zero Knowledge 
Authentication, anything which may increase the danger of confidentiality of the 
secret is not revealed by one party, which is called the claimant. The claimant 
simply has to prove the other part called the verifier that it knows a secret, without 
telling it. The interactions are designed not to give or reveal any secret. After 
interchanging messages, the verifier can only know that the claimant does or 
doesn’t have the secret. The result which is found out is simply a yes/no situation 
that has only single bit of information. Here the three important protocols of Zero 
knowledge Authentication have been implemented, which are Fiat-Shamir 
protocol, Fiege-Fiat Shamir protocol and  Guillou- Quisquater protocol and their 
performances are compared. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
We are living in the age of information. Every aspect’s information has to be kept, 
because information has a value. As an asset it has to be secured.  To be secured, 
we need to hide information from unauthorized access (Confidentiality), protect it 
from unauthorized change (Integrity) , and to make it available to an authorized 
entity whenever it is needed (Availability). In the present world most of the 
communication takes place via unsecured channel, so it is open to various attacks. 
Building a secured channel is very expensive. While sending data we need to take 
care of mainly these goals. 
 Confidentiality:   Security from unknown persons 
 Integrity:   Security from information change 
 Authentication:   Assurance of identification of entity/person 
      These are the primary security goals a message passing system must satisfy for 
a successful communication. In the past, cryptography mainly concerned with the 
confidentiality factor. The most application of cryptography were in the 
department of defense or other organization to collect and report secret information 
on an enemy or competitor. Integrity verification, user authentication, digital 
signatures etc. have been added to the confidentiality. 
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           1.1 Entity Authentication: 
           
          It is basically a technique that is used by one party to prove the identity of another party. 
An entity may be a client, a process or a person. The entity whose identity has to be known is 
called a Claimant while the entity which proves the identity of the claimant is called the 
Verifier. When A tries to prove the identity of B, B is called the claimant and A is called the 
Verifier. 
 
Difference with Message Authentication: 
                   We generally differentiate message authentication from entity 
authentication by 2 ways. 
 Message authentication is not a real time authentication; while entity 
authentication does. In the message authentication when A sends a message 
to B, the claimant may or may not be in the process while they are 
communicating. Contrary to message authentication, in the entity 
authentication there is not a message which is involved until B is 
authenticated by A. 
 Message Authentication simply authenticates one message, as the process 
has to repeat it for each new message. Entity authentication authenticates the 
claimant for the entire session. 
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1.2 Types of Entity Authentication: 
 
In claimant verification, the claimant must be identified by the verifier. This 
verification can be done with one of the three kind of techniques: anything 
known, anything possessed, anything inherited. 
 
1. Anything Known: A secret known to claimant, which is checked by 
the verifier. Example- a pin, a key (secret) etc. 
2. Anything Possessed: This is used to prove the claimant’s identity. 
Example- a credit card, driving license. 
3. Anything Inherited: Inherent characteristics of the claimant are 
described here. Example- normal signatures, biometric characteristics. 
 
                 There are 3 types of Entity Authentication. 
1. Password based Authentication 
2. Challenge Response Authentication 
3. Zero Knowledge Authentication 
 
 
1.2.1 Password based Authentication: 
This is the simplest and the most used entity authentication technique, in 
which case the claimant has an idea about the password. A password is 
used when a user needs the system to be accessed. Each user has a public 
user identification, and a password, which is the private key. This 
authentication scheme is divided into 2 types. 
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1.2.1.1 Fixed Password:  A fixed password is used repeatedly for every access.  
Several schemes have been built, one upon the other. 
 
 
Fig.1.1 User ID and Password file 
1.2.1.2 One-time Password: This is used only once for gaining access. This kind 
of password makes eavesdropping and salting useless. 
 
 
Fig.1.2  Lamport one-time password 
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1.2.2 Challenge Response Authentication 
In password based authentication, the claimant demonstrates to prove a secret.  
However because the claimant reveals this secret, it is open to various attacks. In 
the Challenge Response authentication, the claimant has to prove that it has the 
knowledge of the password without letting the verifier know. In other words the 
claimant doesn’t send the secret to the verifier, the latter can search for it and find 
it. 
                  The Challenge is basically a time-varying value like any random 
number.  The claimant applies a function to the challenge and sends the result, 
which is termed as a response, to the verifier. The response shows that the claimant 
has knowledge about the secret. 
It can be done by four methods. 
1. Using a Symmetric-key cipher 
2. Using keyed-hash functions 
3. Using  Asymmetric-key cipher 
4. Using Digital Signatures 
 
 
1.2.2.1 Using a Symmetric key cipher 
Several approaches to challenge-response authentication use symmetric-key 
encryption. The secret shared key, which is known to both claimant and the 
verifier. An encrypting algorithm is applied on the challenge. 
 In the first approach, the verifier sends a nonce, a random number used only 
once to challenge the claimant. A nonce must be time varying, everytime it 
is created, it is different. 
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Fig.1.3 Nonce challenge 
 
 
 In the second approach, we find that the time-varying value is a timestamp, 
which continues to vary with time. Challenge message here is the current 
time sent by the verifier to the claimant. 
 
 
Fig. 1.4 Timestamp challenge 
 
 1st and 2nd approaches are for unidirectional authentication. If Alice also 
needs to be sure of the Bob’s identity this approach is used. 
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Fig.1.5 Bidirectional authentication 
1.2.2.2 Using a Keyed hash functions 
Here we basically use a keyed-hash function (MAC). It has the advantage of 
preserving the identity. 
 
 
Fig.1.6 Keyed-hash function 
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1.2.2.3 Using Asymmetric key Cipher 
          Here the private key used by the claimant is the part of the secret. The 
claimant has to show that he/she has the private key, which is related to the public 
key which everyone has access to. 
 First approach is used where verifier encrypts the challenge by using 
claimant’s private key. Then the claimant can decrypt the message by using 
its secret key and sends a timestamp (nonce). In the second approach, two 
public keys are used each in one direction.  
 
 In the second approach, two public keys are used each in one direction 
 
 Fig.1.7  Bidirectional, asymmetric key 
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1.2.2.4 Using Digital Signature 
Entity authentication can also be achieved by using a digital signature. When a 
digital signature is used for entity authentication, the claimant uses her private key 
for signing.  
 
 
Fig.1.8  Bidirectional authentication 
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1.2.3 Zero Knowledge Authentication 
 
In Cryptography, the Zero Knowledge confirmation/convention is a sort of 
convention in which one entity (claimant) demonstrates an alternate entity 
(verifier) that a certain information is genuine separated from the way that it 
doesn't pass on that the data given is genuine or false. 
                       If to demonstrate the proclamation we require some data from the 
claimant, then the verifier can't take care of the issue on the grounds that it doesn't 
have the data. On the off chance that the information tells that the claimant just has 
the mystery data, it turns into an uncommon case known as zero-learning 
verification strategy. It demonstrates that learning of given data is vital if one is 
permitted to uncover that data; the test demonstrates that one has notable 
information even without uncovering the mystery.                                    
                    For zero-information strategy, the protocol need to have intuitive data 
from the verifier, for the most part as a test, so that the reactions from the inquirer 
will have the verifier persuaded that if and if the articulation is genuine (i.e., if the 
petitioner to be sure has some guaranteed learning). This is the situation, since in 
the other case the verifier can record it and replay it someplace else. In the event 
that this were to be acknowledged by the late gathering as evidence that the 
replaying gathering surely has some information about the mystery data, then the 
acknowledgement of the new gathering could be defended as the verifier has 
learning about the mystery data. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Survey 
 
A Zero-knowledge technique must satisfy three conditions: 
1. Completeness: if this statement is true, the honest verifier will always be 
convinced of this fact by an honest claimant. 
2. Soundness: If the statement provided by the claimant is false, no cheating 
claimant will be able to convince the honest verifier that it is actually true. 
3. Zero-knowledge: If the statement is true, no cheating verifier can learn 
anything other than this property. This is proved by showing that every 
cheating verifier has some simulator that can give a fake transcript of 
interaction between the claimant and the verifier when it has to prove about 
the relationship. 
. 
                   Zero knowledge evidences are not proofs in the scientific feeling of the 
term on the grounds that there is some little likelihood, the soundness mistake, that 
a swindling petitioner will have the capacity to persuade the verifier of a false 
proclamation. At the end of the day, zero-information evidences are probabilistic 
"confirmations" as opposed to deterministic verifications. Be that as it may, there 
are systems to diminish the soundness lapse to irrelevantly little values. 
 
               A formal meaning of zero-information need to utilize some 
computational model, that of a Turing machine. Let P, V, and S be turing 
machines. An intelligent evidence framework with  for a dialect  is zero-
information if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) verifier  there exists a 
normal PPT test system  such that 
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Fig. 2.1 Basic zero knowledge scheme 
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There are basically 3 protocols for implementing the Zero- Knowledge protocol. 
1. Fiat-Shamir Protocol 
2. Feige-Fiat-Shamir Protocol 
3. Guillou-Quisquater  Protocol 
 
 
2.1 Fiat-Shamir Protocol 
           In the Fiat-Shamir convention, a trusted outsider picks two vast prime 
numbers p and q to ascertain the quality of n=p*q. The quality of n is affirmed to 
general society; the qualities of p and q are kept mystery. Alice the inquirer picks a 
mystery number s between 1 and n-1. She ascertains v=s2 mod n. She keeps s as 
her private key and registers v as her open key with the outsider. Confirmation of 
Alice by Bob is possible in four steps. 
1. Alice, the Claimant picks a number between 0 to n-1, and r being called the 
commitment. She can evaluate the value of x=r2 mod n; and name the value 
of x as witness. 
2. The value of x is sent to Bob by Alice as witness. 
3. Then Bob sends a value of c, which is called as the commitment. It can be 
either 0or 1. 
4. Alice evaluates the response y=r sc. Here r, s, c carry their usual meaning. 
5. Alice sends the value of response y and claims to be Alice. 
6. Bob calculates y2 and x vc .If these two values are congruent, then Bob can 
conclude that Alice either knows the value of the secret key or he has 
guesses the value of y in some other dishonest ways.   
 
Y2= (r sc) 2=r2 s2c=r2 (s2) c=x vc 
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2.2 Feige -Fiat-Shamir Protocol 
        The Feige -Fiat-Shamir convention is like the first approach aside from it 
utilizes a vector of private keys [s1, s2… .,sk] , a vector of open keys [v1, v2,… ..vk] 
and a vector of difficulties (c1, c2… .ck).  The private keys are picked arbitrarily, 
yet they must be relatively prime to n. People in general keys are picked such that  
                     Vi= (Si 2 )-1mod n 
We have to prove that y2v1
c1v2
c2……is congruent to x. 
 
2.3 Guillou- Quisquater Protocol 
          The Guillou-Quisquater Protocol is a growth of Fiat-Shamir convention in 
which fewer rounds could be utilized to demonstrate the personality of the 
petitioner. A trusted outsider picks two prime numbers p and 1 to compute the 
worth of n=p*q.  The trusted gathering likewise declares the example e, which is 
co-prime with φ=(p-1)(q-1). The qualities of n and e are advertised to people in 
general while the worth of p and q are kept mystery. The trusted gathering picks 
two numbers for every element, v which is open and s which is private. However 
for this situation, the relationship between v and s are distinctive. 
                       Se*v =1 mod n 
The three exchanges constitute a round; verification is repeated several times with 
a random value c between 1 and e. the claimant has to pass the test in every round 
to get verified. If she fails a single round, then the process is aborted and she is not 
authenticated.  
         ye vc =(r sc) e vc=re*sce*vc=re (sev)c=x(1)c=x 
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Chapter 3 
3.1 Implementation  
 
3.1.1 Fiat-Shamir Protocol 
cccc xvsrsrrsy  )()( 222222
 
Fig.3.1 Fiat-Shamir Protocol Scheme 
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As we know according to this protocol, it is verified with different value of c and 
the claimant has to pass all round to verify itself. Failing to one single round, the 
process is aborted. 
 As we know Alice can be honest or dishonest. By being honest he can pass 
each round and if she is not honest, if she can guess all values of challenges, 
then also she can pass every round. 
 If she is dishonest and she guesses that the value of c is 1, she may evaluate 
the value of x=r2/v and thus can send x to be the witness. 
1. If she guessed it correctly, then she will send y=r as her response. 
2. If she is wrong, a value which will pass the test can’t be found, thus 
the process will be aborted by Bob. 
 
 Then if Alice guesses that c is 0, she may evaluate the value of x=r2 and x 
will be sent as a witness. 
1. If she guessed it correctly, then y=r will be sent as response. 
2. If she is wrong, then the process will abort. 
 
                   Thus we can easily find that the verifier has 50% chance 
to fool the claimant. If this process is repeated many times, then the 
chance of claimant deceiving the verifier will reduce by a great 
margin. 
. 
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 Ali Baba Cave Problem 
Suppose there is a underground cave like the below cave with a door at both end 
which will open with some magic word. Alice says that she knows the word and 
thus can open the door. Suppose both Alice and Bob are standing at the entrance 
point A, then Alice goes to B, where Bob can’t see Alice. 
 Alice can move to either right or left and it can be corresponded to the 
witness. 
 Then Bob comes to B and asks Alice to come from left or right and thus it 
corresponds to challenge. 
 If Alice knows the word, she can come from any side which is requested. 
Because if she is on the right side, she can come easily and if on the wrong 
side, she can use the magic word to come from the requested side. 
 This game can be repeated many times, Alice can win the game if she can 
pass the test all the time. The probability of her winning the game is very 
less if doesn’t have the private key (word).  
              So if the game is run N times and as each time Alice has ½  chance of 
winnig.so the chance of Alice winning the game is (1/2)N. 
  
 
 
Fig.3.2 Ali Baba Cave 
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3.1.2 Fiege-Fiat-Shamir Protocol 
 
Fig.3.3 Fiege-Fiat-Shamir Protocol Scheme 
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3.1.3 Guillou-Quisquater Protocol 
 By performing a series of verification experiment, it is possible to prove that 
you know a certain secret without sharing it with anyone. 
 Zero-Knowledge Protocols help prevent leaks of any secret information by not 
directly requesting the secret itself during verification. 
 Zero-Knowledge Protocols won’t care if you actually know the password or 
not, as long as you can prove that you know it. 
 Faking the proof of knowing the secret is possible, but it has a low probability 
of success. 
 It is an extension of Fiat-Shamir Protocol. 
           xxvsr
vsrvsrvy
ccee
cceececce


1)(
)(
 
Fig.3.4 Guillou-Quisquater Algorithm 
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3.2 Real World Applications 
1. Network Authentications 
2. Smart Cards 
3. Key Exchanges 
4. Digital Signatures 
 
 
3.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Zero 
Knowledge Authentication 
 
Advantages of Zero-Knowledge Protocols: 
• Secured – It doesn’t require someone to reveal secret.. 
• Simple – Critical encryption methods are not necessary.. 
 
Disadvantages of Zero-Knowledge Protocols: 
• Limited – Translation might be necessary if secret is not a number.  
• Lengthy – As it has almost 2k entity, it takes a lot of time to compute. 
• Imperfect – The Intruder can still intercept the message (i.e. messages to the 
Verifier might be modified or destroyed). 
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3.4 Results 
  3.4.1Fiat-Shamir Protocol 
 
Fig.3.5 Fiat-Shamir Server side 
 
Fig.3.6 Fiat-Shamir Client side 
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3.4.2 Fiege-Fiat-Shamir Protocol 
 
Fig.3.7 Feige-Fiat-Shamir Client side 
 
 
Fig.3.8 Feige-Fiat-Shamir Server side 
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3.4.3 Guillou-Quisquater Protocol 
 
Fig.3.9 Guillou-Quisquater Server side 
 
Fig.3.10 Guillou-Quisquater Client side 
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Chapter 4 
Analysis 
4.1 Security Analysis 
The security of the first Fiat-Shamir plot fundamentally might be centered around 
the way that discovering the square foundations of irregular vj qualities is truly 
troublesome as the factorization of the modulus. The new procedure can’t 
straightforwardly pertinent to the new form, as the extraction of square bases of 
little primes may be less demanding than discovering those of the arbitrary 
numbers. 
 
                     For straightforwardness purpose, we think just the security of the 
distinguishing proof plan (the mark plan may require a more particular result), the 
ID conspire being referred to being focused around zero-learning evidences. This 
implies that the verification of character is constituted by an evidence of "learning 
of something." Since the gatherings execute stand out round of the convention, the 
petitioner can succeed with likelihood 1/2 regardless of the possibility that all the 
primes are quadratic non-deposits! Essentially, the convention is not an evidence 
of learning of square roots (either for a specific prime or for all the primes). 
 
               The information tape could discover the square bases of 11 the 400  
Pair savvy results of the primes, and in this way a smart claimant could persuade 
the verifier with likelihood 1/2 without really knowing even one of the first roots.  
 
               This is worth specifying that while such a presumption is sufficient to 
demonstrate the security of the new plan, it for the most part doesn't surmise that 
our plan is frail! Actually, regardless of the possibility that a swindling verifier 
knows how to element n by utilizing the square foundations of a little number of 
little primes, he is unrealistic to get hold of these square roots since the plans are 
the parallel renditions of zero learning conventions. 
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4.2 Attacks  
 
Here are some attacks which are used to mainly break the Zero Knowledge 
techniques.  
 
 Impersonation  
 Replay  
 Interleaving  
 Reflection  
 Forced Delay  
 Chosen-text  
 
 
 Impersonation is the act of pretending of an entity.  
 Replay attack utilizes an impersonation involving use of information from 
an already used protocol repeatedly on the verifier. 
 An impersonation which involves a certain combination of information from 
previous protocols executions is called as an interleaving attack. 
 Reflection is an interleaving attack which involves sending information from 
an ongoing protocol execution to the original entity. 
  An adversary when it intercepts a message and uses it in the later stages is 
using a forced delay attack.  
 And finally, a chosen-text attack is when an adversary chooses specific 
challenges for gaining information about the secret or private key. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
Zero-Knowledge conventions permit the verifier to demonstrate to the verifier that 
they know a mystery without uncovering data about that mystery. By thinking 
about qualities between the dedication and reaction, the verifier can ascertain 
whether the reaction matches the normal worth. This permits the verifier to check 
data without having any learning of s, the mystery private to the verifier. This 
procedure might be utilized to permit unnamed confirmation in gadgets, for 
example, RFID labels. Particularly where protection of mystery data is at a 
premium, for example, travel permits, RFID labels with a Zero Knowledge 
convention could be utilized to ensure particular data while as of now being 
utilized to verifier the validness of the individual with the passport. 
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